René Descartes
Discourse on Method (1637)
Part One
From my childhood, I have been familiar with letters; and
as I was given to believe that by their help a clear and
certain knowledge of all that is useful in life might be acquired, I was
ardently desirous of instruction. But as soon as I had finished the entire
course of study, at the close of which it is customary to be admitted into the
order of the learned, I completely changed my opinion. For I found myself
involved in so many doubts and
errors, that I was convinced I had advanced no farther in all my attempts at
learning, than the discovery at every turn of my own ignorance. And yet I was
studying in one of the most celebrated schools in Europe,
in which I thought there must be learned men, if such were anywhere to be
found. I had been taught all that others learned there; and
not contented with the sciences actually taught us, I had, in addition, read
all the books that had fallen into my hands,
treating of such branches as are esteemed the most curious and rare. I knew the judgment which others had
formed of me; and I did not find
that I was considered inferior to my fellows, although there were among them
some who were already marked out to fill the places of our instructors. And, in
fine, our age appeared to me as flourishing, and
as fertile in powerful minds as any preceding one. I was thus led to take the
liberty of judging of all other men by myself, and
of concluding that there was no science in existence that was of such a nature
as I had previously been given to believe.
I still continued, however, to hold in esteem the studies of the schools. I
was aware that the languages taught in them are necessary to the understanding of the writings of the ancients; that the
grace of fable stirs the mind; that the memorable deeds of history elevate it; and, if read with discretion, aid in forming the
judgment; that the perusal of all excellent books is, as it were, to interview
with the noblest men of past ages, who have written them…
I revered our theology, and
aspired as much as any one to reach heaven: but being given assuredly to
understand that the way is not less
open to the most ignorant than to the most learned, and
that the revealed truths which lead to heaven are above our comprehension, I
did not presume to subject them to the impotency of my reason; and I thought that in order competently to undertake
their examination, there was need of some special help from heaven, and of being more than man.
Of philosophy I will say nothing, except that when I saw that it had been
cultivated for many ages by the most distinguished men, and
that yet there is not a single matter within its sphere which is not still in
dispute, and nothing, therefore,
which is above doubt, I did not presume to anticipate that my success would be
greater in it than that of others; and
further, when I considered the number of conflicting opinions touching a single
matter that may be upheld by learned men, while there can be but one true, I
reckoned as well-nigh false all that was only probable….
For these reasons, as soon as my age permitted me to pass from under the
control of my instructors, I entirey abandoned the study of letters, and
resolved no longer to seek any other science than the knowledge of myself, or
of the great book of the world. I spent the remainder of my youth in traveling,
in visiting courts and armies, in
holding intercourse with men of different dispositions and
ranks, in collecting varied experience, in proving myself in the different
situations into which fortune threw me, and,
above all, in making such reflection on the matter of my experience as to
secure my improvement. For it occurred to me that I should find much more truth
in the reasonings of each individual with reference
to the affairs in which he is personally interested, and
the issue of which must presently punish him if he has judged amiss, than in
those conducted by a man of letters in his study, regarding speculative matters
that are of no practical moment, and
followed by no consequences to himself, farther, perhaps, than that they foster
his vanity the better the more remote they are from common sense; requiring, as
they must in this case, the exercise of greater ingenuity and art to render them probable. In addition, I had
always a most earnest desire to know how to distinguish the true from the
false, in order that I might be able clearly to discriminate the right path in
life, and proceed in it with
confidence.
… But after I had been occupied several years in thus studying the book of
the world, and in essaying to gather
some experience, I at length resolved to make myself an object of study, and to employ all the powers of my mind in choosing
the paths I ought to follow, an undertaking which was accompanied with greater
success than it would have been had I never quitted my country or my books.
Part Two
…It is true, however, that it is not customary to pull down all the houses
of a town with the single design of rebuilding them differently, and thereby rendering the streets more handsome; but it often happens that a private individual
takes down his own with the view of erecting it anew, and
that people are even sometimes constrained to this when their houses are in
danger of falling from age, or when the foundations are insecure. With this
before me by way of example, I was persuaded that it would indeed be
preposterous for a private individual to think of reforming a state by
fundamentally changing it throughout, and
overturning it in order to set it up amended; and
the same I thought was true of any similar project for reforming the body of
the sciences, or the order of teaching them established in the schools: but as
for the opinions which up to that time I had embraced, I thought that I could
not do better than resolve at once to sweep them wholly away, that I might afterwards
be in a position to admit either others more correct, or even perhaps the same
when they had undergone the scrutiny of reason. I firmly believed that in this
way I should much better succeed in the conduct of my life, than if I built
only upon old foundations, and
leaned upon principles which, in my youth, I had taken upon trust. For although I recognized various difficulties in this undertaking,
these were not, however, without remedy, nor once to be compared with such as
attend the slightest reformation in public affairs. Large bodies, if
once overthrown, are with great difficulty set up again, or even kept erect
when once seriously shaken, and the
fall of such is always disastrous. Then if there are any imperfections in the
constitutions of states (and that
many such exist the diversity of constitutions is alone sufficient to assure
us), custom has without doubt materially smoothed their inconveniences, and has even managed to steer altogether clear of,
or insensibly corrected a number which sagacity could not have provided against
with equal effect; and, in fine, the
defects are almost always more tolerable than the change necessary for their
removal; in the same manner that highways which wind among mountains, by being
much frequented, become gradually so smooth and
commodious, that it is much better to follow them than to seek a straighter
path by climbing over the tops of rocks and
descending to the bottoms of precipices.
Hence it is that I cannot in any degree approve of those restless and busy meddlers who, called neither by birth nor
fortune to take part in the management of public affairs, are yet always
projecting reforms; and if I thought
that this tract contained aught which might justify the suspicion that I was a
victim of such folly, I would by no means permit its publication. I have never contemplated anything higher than the reformation of
my own opinions, and basing them on
a foundation wholly my own. And although my own satisfaction with my
work has led me to present here a draft of it, I do not by any means therefore
recommend to every one else to make a similar attempt. Those whom God has
endowed with a larger measure of genius will entertain, perhaps, designs still
more exalted; but for the many I am much afraid lest even the present undertaking
be more than they can safely venture to imitate. The single design to strip
one's self of all past beliefs is one that ought not to be taken by every one.
The majority of men is composed of two classes, for neither of which would this
be at all a befitting resolution: in the first place, of those who with more
than a due confidence in their own powers, are precipitate in their judgments and want the patience requisite for orderly and circumspect thinking; whence it happens, that if
men of this class once take the liberty to doubt of their accustomed opinions, and quit the beaten highway, they will never be able
to thread the byway that would lead them by a shorter course, and will lose themselves and
continue to wander for life; in the
second place, of those who, possessed of sufficient sense or modesty to
determine that there are others who excel them in the power of discriminating
between truth and error, and by whom they may be instructed, ought rather to
content themselves with the opinions of such than trust for more correct to
their own reason.
For my own part, I should doubtless have belonged to the latter class, had I
received instruction from but one master, or had I never known the diversities
of opinion that from time immemorial have prevailed among men of the greatest
learning. But I had become aware, even so early as during my college life, that
no opinion, however absurd and
incredible, can be imagined, which has not been maintained by some on of the
philosophers; and afterwards in the
course of my travels I remarked that all those whose opinions are decidedly
repugnant to ours are not in that account barbarians and
savages, but on the contrary that many of these nations make an equally good,
if not better, use of their reason than we do. I took into account also the
very different character which a person brought up from infancy in France or
Germany exhibits, from that which, with the same mind originally, this
individual would have possessed had he lived always among the Chinese or with
savages, and the circumstance that
in dress itself the fashion which pleased us ten years ago, and which may again, perhaps, be received into favor
before ten years have gone, appears to us at this moment extravagant and ridiculous. I was thus led to infer that the
ground of our opinions is far more custom and
example than any certain knowledge. And, finally, although such be the ground
of our opinions, I remarked that a plurality of suffrages is no guarantee of
truth where it is at all of difficult discovery, as in such cases it is much
more likely that it will be found by one than by many. I could, however, select
from the crowd no one whose opinions seemed worthy of preference, and thus I found myself constrained, as it were, to
use my own reason in the conduct of my life…
But like one walking alone and in
the dark, I resolved to proceed so slowly and
with such circumspection, that if I did not advance far, I would at least guard
against falling. I did not even choose to dismiss summarily any of the opinions
that had crept into my belief without having been introduced by reason, but
first of all took sufficient time carefully to satisfy myself of the general
nature of the task I was setting myself, and
ascertain the true method by which to arrive at the knowledge of whatever lay
within the compass of my powers.
…By these considerations I was induced to seek some other method which would
comprise the advantages of the three and
be exempt from their defects. And as a multitude of laws often only hampers
justice, so that a state is best governed when, with few laws, these are
rigidly administered; in like manner, instead of the great number of precepts
of which logic is composed, I believed that the four following would prove
perfectly sufficient for me, provided I took the firm and
unwavering resolution never in a single instance to fail in observing them.
The first was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know
to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and
to comprise nothing more in my judgement than what
was presented to my mind so clearly and
distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt.
The second, to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as
many parts as possible, and as might
be necessary for its adequate solution.
The third, to conduct my thoughts in such order that, by commencing with
objects the simplest and easiest to
know, I might ascend by little and
little, and, as it were, step by
step, to the knowledge of the more complex; assigning in thought a certain
order even to those objects which in their own nature do not stand in a relation of antecedence and sequence.
And the last, in every case to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so general, that
I might be assured that nothing was omitted….
But the chief ground of my satisfaction with thus method,
was the assurance I had of thereby exercising my reason in all matters, if not
with absolute perfection, at least with the greatest attainable by me: besides,
I was conscious that by its use my mind was becoming gradually habituated to
clearer and more distinct
conceptions of its objects…
Part Four
…[A]s I then desired to give my
attention solely to the search after truth, I thought that a procedure exactly
the opposite was called for, and
that I ought to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to which I
could suppose the least ground for doubt, in order to ascertain whether after
that there remained aught in my belief that was wholly indubitable.
Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to
suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; and because some men err in reasoning, and fall into paralogisms,
even on the simplest matters of geometry, I, convinced that I was as open to
error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings
I had hitherto taken for demonstrations; and
finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we
experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there
is at that time not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects
(presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no
more truth than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately upon this I
observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was
absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think,
therefore I am (COGITO ERGO SUM), was so certain and
of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged
by the sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded
that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the
philosophy of which I was in search….